Open Society Fund

Centre for Liberal Strategies

ACCESS Association

M A C E D O N I A :

C O N F L I C T I N G P E R S P E C T I V E S

by Stefan Popov

Centre for Liberal Strategies

Sofia, Bulgaria, Europe

January 1999

C O N T E N T S

PREFACE

INTRODUCTION

Subject and Theses

Methodological Note

1. THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION: THE LEGITIMATE PERSPECTIVE

1.1. Rational Discourse and/or Century-long Emotion

1.2. Two Ages and Their Perspectives

(a) Change at the factual level

(b) Change in a regional context

1.3. Science and Folklore: Political Use

1.4. The Language Dispute In an International Context

1.5. Disagreement with the Western Perspective

2. CONTEXT

2.1. The Elections from 1990 to 1996

2.2. Political Parties

2.3. Constitutional Reform

(a) Outline of Principles

(b) Political Interpretation

3. THE 1998 ELECTIONS: POLITICAL ASPECTS

3.1. Electoral Coalitions

3.2. Election Results and Post-Electoral Coalitions

4. DOMINANT PERSPECTIVES ON THE MACEDONIAN CASE

4.1. Internal Macedonian Perspectives

4.2. Bulgarian Perspectives

4.3. Perspective of the So-called International Community

4.4. Regional Perceptions

5. TWO VISIONS ON THE MACEDONIAN CASE

5.1. "Normal" Interpretation and List of Issues

5.2. Radical Interpretation and Risk Factors

(a) Introductory methodological note

(b) An outside view: the occupational ring

(d) Mutual intensification of the "outside" and

"inside" perceptions

6. CONCLUSION

6.1. A Look Back

6.2. A Look Forward

PREFACE

(Author's Note)

This analysis is the product of a joint project implemented

by ACCESS Association and the Centre for Liberal Strategies

(CLS), and financed by the Open Society Fund.

The project was implemented in two stages.

In stage one, a team of Bulgarian experts joined the

OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission as short-term observers

of the first round of the parliamentary elections in the Republic

of Macedonia in October 1998. The team analyzed the election

campaign, the role of the media, the new voting system and the

course of the elections. The Bulgarian Association for Fair

Elections and Civil Rights also took part in the observation

mission and analysis.

In stage two, the Open Society Fund commissioned, in line

with the Board of Directors' new pro-active policy, a theoretical

survey of the political situation in present-day Macedonia. In

the course of the analysis it became obvious that starting with a

"policy paper," where the priority is on recommendations, would

not be the best approach. The appropriate first step would be to

examine "the Macedonian issue" in its specific local, regional

and international context, to describe the specific features of

"Macedonia as a problem situation," and to formulate the specific

questions relevant to "the Macedonian case." Hence this paper is

intended as an introduction to an operational political analysis

that will help politicians in decision-making.

I would like to thank Mr Eugene Daynov in his capacity as

Chairman of the Open Society Fund Board of Directors, of which I

am a member too, and Mr Georgi Genchev, Executive Director of the

Fund, for the understanding which they showed for a project whose

relevance at the present moment cannot be overstated. I am also

especially grateful to my colleagues from the Centre for Liberal

Strategies for their help in the course of the extensive

rewriting and editing of this text. All who know the CLS will

know that this analysis is the product of team work, even though

the liability for any omissions and faults is mine alone.

Stefan Popov

CLS

Sofia, Bulgaria, Europe

18 January 1999

INTRODUCTION

Subject and theses

The subject of this political analysis is present-day

Macedonia. The point of reference is the 1998 parliamentary

elections. The commentary sets out to formulate the following

theses:

The crisis in the Balkans cannot be surmounted unless a

solution to the notorious "Macedonian Question" is found. This is

the question of whether there is a Macedonian nation-state at

all. By tradition, it has been answered by a conflict of

perspectives, but in the absence of Macedonia and its own

perspective. Hence the reason for the stubborn persistence of

this question. If Macedonia were to be involved in its

resolution, it would become obvious that "the question" is no

longer relevant. It would simply be forgotten. And that would be

its genuine solution. The alternatives are Doomsday scenarios - a

final solution to the "Macedonian Question" without Macedonia's

participation would mean disintegration of Macedonian statehood.

The elections in Macedonia were undoubtedly one of the 1998

highlights in the turbulent Balkan region. Yet they only marked a

beginning. In 1999, Macedonia will break out of isolation, and

this will raise a new range of political issues in the Balkan

region. The issue of regional security will acquire a new

dimension. In a political context "Macedonia" - and this is this

writer's position, as well as his motive for writing this paper -

will be among the most frequently used names in the Balkans. This

change provides a wide range of new opportunities for the

settlement of disputes over Macedonia. A prudent but bold and

imaginative foreign policy should not miss the chances that will

be offered in 1999.

Methodological note

This analysis applies a dual perspective. On the one hand,

it describes facts and events in Macedonia itself. On the other,

"the Macedonian phenomenon" is approached as an intersection of

different types of perspectives - local, regional, international,

popular, etc. The specificity of "the Macedonian phenomenon"

cannot be understood unless this duality is taken into account:

the reality behind the name "Macedonia" is in the interplay of

these two levels, the level of facts and the level of

perspectives.

1. THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION: THE LEGITIMATE PERSPECTIVE

1.1 Rational discourse and/or century-long emotion

In its immediate geo-cultural and political context,

"Macedonia" designates a tangle of emotions. In this context,

there is little if any rational and pragmatic discourse on

Macedonia. The so-called "Macedonian Question" owes its existence

largely to this circumstance.

This conclusion confronts us with a problem. We observers

from the immediate neighbourhood admit a major shortcoming: that

in talking about Macedonia, we are incapable of using a rational

and universally acceptable language. We also admit that our

attitude to Macedonia is hard to understand for the rational

observer - presumably the Western liberal democratic perspective.

Admitting this handicap, we will proceed with the following

question: Which perspective on the Macedonian Question and what

type of language are internationally legitimate and therefore

rational? We will answer this question indirectly, by commenting

on a popular historical text. In the course of this commentary we

will (a) introduce certain parameters of the internationally

legitimate discourse on Macedonia, and (b) formulate certain

general theses about Macedonia and the Balkans.

Here is how a contemporary Western textbook describes the

Macedonian case some 100 or 120 years ago:

"The population of less than two million within a 25,000

square-mile area was divided into nine distinct groups: Turks,

Bulgars, Greeks, Serbs, Macedonians, Albanians, Vlachs or

Kutzo-Vlachs, Jews, and Gypsies. Since the population was

intermixed, a clear line could not be drawn separating the

nationalities. The cities usually had strong Turkish, Greek and

Jewish elements. In the villages and rural areas different

nationalities existed side by side. Nor was it possible to

determine accurately the precise numerical strength of any of the

groups. Census reports were almost meaningless because the

results usually reflected the interest of the census-taker. There

were school, language and religious censuses, but any of these

could be misleading. [...]

When the struggle over Macedonia became more heated after

the Congress of Berlin, anthropologists, linguists, and

physiologists from the Balkan countries all used their specialty

to claim the area for their own particular nationality. The

Bulgarians used linguistic arguments to demonstrate that the

Macedonian Slavs were indeed their brothers. [...] Serbian

anthropologists argued that their slava festival, found also

among the Macedonians, made them Serbs. The Greeks sought to

demonstrate that anyone in Macedonia under the authority of the

ecumenical patriarch was Greek. Thus, each nation used every

conceivable argument to back its claims, and each could be

effectively challenged.

The real significance of the region, the

geographic-strategic, involved both the Balkan states and the

great powers. Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia all wished to acquire

Macedonia or a major portion of it for three main reasons. First,

it would enlarge the state and incorporate more nationals within

it. Second, the acquisition of the Vardar and Struma river

valleys and the railroads through them would have great economic

advantages. Third, and perhaps most significant, whoever

controlled Macedonia would be the strongest power on the

peninsula. For the great powers this last concern was certainly

the most important." */N-1

This excerpt is useful and edifying for politicians and

political analysts in two ways: on the one hand, for the cited

facts, and, on the other, for the actual attitude to the subject.

We will discuss those two aspects separately. Their

rationalization and comprehension will largely determine whether

Bulgarian policy would gain full-fledged international legitimacy

or, on the contrary, would remain isolated, incomprehensible in a

typical "Balkan way" and, hence, suspicious to the Western

observer.

1.2. Two ages and their perspectives

(a) Change at the factual level

Macedonia has been claimed by its neighbour countries both

in the age to which the aforementioned excerpt refers to and at

present. Those claims are not necessarily formulated in the

respective official national doctrine. Yet whatever form they

might come in, the cravings for Macedonia are strong enough to

imbue the notion of this topos, this land, with portentous

meaning.

In the past age, sentimental attitudes to Macedonia were a

manifestation of nationalism and nationalist self-complacence on

the part of fledgling nation-states. All three neighbour

countries had claims on Macedonia, since they all wanted to

expand, to win geo-economic advantages and to become the

strongest power on the Balkan Peninsula. This state of affairs

will neither surprise nor baffle the contemporary analyst of

nationalist movements from the late 19th century to, and shortly

after, World War I. Aggression is understandable in this case, as

the very period of nation-state formation has been studied

extensively. The language of research on national movements is

not only elaborate, but also popular beyond academia proper.

Territorial and other claims may be overt and brutal, yet they

may also be covert - for instance, lurking behind the smokescreen

of folklore or in ridiculous arguments proffered by physiologists

and sociologists. This does not change the heart of the matter in

any way. Both the form and the real motive are understandable and

explicable. Observers will approach them in a "scientific," i.e.

rational and impartial manner, the way we treat facts from a past

age or from a historical narrative that does not immediately

concern us.

The present state of affairs is so different that the

complications over the so-called "Macedonian Question" are very

confusing for Western politicians and analysts. Nationalist

movements and nation-state formation In Europe are now history.

With few exceptions, the central zones of European civilization

have shaken free of primitive nationalist drives and emotions.

Even if they should flare up somewhere, Western societies have

built systems of preventive measures and buffer mechanisms

absorbing the nationalist energy before it could become a leading

motive in foreign policy. Intentions to redraw borders, to stake

claims to nations and states, to their by now naturalized

identity, sound anachronistic, dangerous, to some extent even

incomprehensible. Whereas political thinking and projection in

terms of former geopolitical models breeds suspicion.

It is for those and similar reasons that Western observers

of events in the Balkans and in Macedonia, in particular, find it

hard to understand exactly what is going on in this part of the

world. Let us examine the change and its significance in several

consecutive stages. Prima facie, the change could be described,

for instance, as follows:

On the one hand, (1) there is no ground to presume that

Macedonia has kept its former strategic importance, that it

offers exceptional geopolitical advantages and that control over

Macedonia means control over the entire peninsula; (2) today

recognition of internationally acknowledged territorial-political

entities has become the norm, and any departure from that norm is

considered an encroachment on the order codified in international

law.

Yet on the other hand, significant aspects of the attitude

to Macedonia are still reminiscent of the three neighbour

countries' attitudes decades ago: sentimentality, nationalist

romanticism, quasi-scientific fabrications and absurd arguments

are still very much in circulation. Today they are used to deny

the reality of the Macedonian nation, language and culture, which

are just as real for the traditional Western observer as the

Macedonian public and political elite want them to be. The state

is sovereign and has been recognized as such, so those realities

are even vested in a Constitution and international law. Since

there is no other measure of existence for the Western type of

rationality, the latter cannot understand this attitude to

Macedonia. Nor can it make head or tail of the notorious

Macedonian Question.

From an objective rational perspective, the difference

between the picture of the past and the present age appears to be

the following:

While aggression in the earlier age is attributed to the

nature of the nationalist movements typical of the period,

present attitudes to Macedonia as a limb severed from a neighbour

country's national body look irrational, inexplicable and very,

very suspicious.

(b) Change in a regional context

This state of affairs is not typical of other cases on the

Balkan Peninsula, in which nationalities without a state of their

own have claimed one and the same territory. Let us consider this

thesis in greater detail.

First, most civil and military conflicts in crumbling

Yugoslavia have been overtly nationalist in character. The

belligerents in them have virtually seized territory. The ethnic

resources have been activated for the conquest of living space,

and national myths have been blown up into the most aggressive

form possible. They have been used for direct identification of

the national community's enemies - as in the drastic case of the

Serbian myth about Kosovo or the deliberately propagated threat

of Islamization on the territory of Bosnia. Ethnic cleansing has

not been covert. It has been conducted consistently, in the plain

sight of the so-called international community, in some cases

even with the latter's tacit consent.

Second, those cases of conflict and civil war have had a

beginning and an end, perhaps a surprising and unpredictable

beginning and a difficult end. By rule, however, the warring

parties have had limited resources to prolong the conflict, and

the tasks of surmounting or freezing the latter may be formulated

and resolved by means of mediation. This was the case in Bosnia,

where a rather artificial agreement has survived for four years

now. This might also be the case in Kosovo, where the interests

are distinguishable, and even if the Albanians were to continue

fighting for full independence, the conflict and its stages would

remain predictable, with the scenarios described long before the

conflict actually flared up.

The Macedonian case is quite different from those

commonplace forms of conflict on the periphery of Europe. The

first concrete reminder of the differences comes from the

century-long relevance of the Macedonian Question, which has been

accompanied by confusion about exactly what this question is

supposed to be. Over the years, this lack of clarity has

intensified rather than subsided: the brutal but nonetheless

clear territorial claims have been replaced by claims to symbols

and intellectual products. This situation has not taken the form

of a political process headed in a particular direction. This is

wholly due to the fact that for one reason or another, it has not

been used for attaining political objectives. Yet it has a high

risk potential, since it can be controlled by political means -

as developments on the Balkans have shown all too clearly in the

past decade - and may develop in an unpredictable direction.

The passions aroused by Macedonia have not translated into

explicit claims to Macedonian territory. Non-recognition of the

Macedonian national symbols, language, nation, etc. is not a

manifestation of an overt policy of aggression. However, those

passions have an enormous mobilizing potential.

Let us try to approach the specific Macedonian case in the

light of the above thesis with due consideration for the issue of

the language used in the local, regional and international debate

on the "Macedonian Question."

Let us assume that Macedonia is a vertical structure built

from different components arranged in ascending layers. Territory

is at the ground level - but since it is detached from the other

layers, it is confined to geographic and physical

characteristics. Next come population, history, language,

mythology, culture, economy, juridical relations, nationalities,

their symbols, political relations, nascent forms of state

self-organization, etc. - all the way up to the Constitution and

the State. Those numerous layers sandwiched between territory and

state have been claimed by neighbour countries. The nature of

those claims has varied from one age to another.

In the early age of nation-state formation, Macedonia's

neighbours staked claims to the bottom and top layers - to

territory and state. They either did not bother to justify those

claims or cited different intermediate layers as proof of their

entitlement to Macedonia. The prime interest was in Macedonia's

territory, while arguments about the language, history, culture,

ethnicity, etc. were secondary. Those who succeeded in acquiring

the Macedonian territory would be entitled to the Macedonian

state; hence the other claim was to the right to build a state on

this territory. Thus the outcome of fulfilled claims to

Macedonian territory and rule over it is clear in the early age

of nation-state formation - the history of Macedonia is actually

a history of fulfilled, half-fulfilled and unfulfilled claims to

its territory.

In the later age, today, the claims have been virtually

upended. The neighbour countries have recognized the Macedonian

state and territory and have no claims to them. However, they are

now claiming the intermediate layers of the structure: the

nation, culture, language, history, etc. Yet what form would a

possible fulfillment of those claims take? It is hard to say. If

they were to be fulfilled, we would have to assume that the

structure had a territory and state institutions - and nothing

else in between. That it had no language, culture, history,

nation, etc. This assumption is simply impossible - it is absurd.

The claims have been upended, with the priority now shifted on to

what used to be of secondary importance in the earlier age.

Since such a picture of the Macedonian case and of fulfilled

claims to Macedonia is inconceivable, the Western observer's

natural reaction would be to wonder what does it actually hide,

what is behind it, what is the real claim and objective. Thus the

issue of Macedonia will inevitably become a political issue par

excellence, which it essentially is anyway.

The language of present-day contacts with Macedonia is

problematic for Western observers. They are forced to interpret

it and to be wary of implicit meanings and implications. This

interpretation logically prompts them to conclude that the claims

to spiritual and intellectual structures are only latent forms of

possible large-scale aggression which is certainly not without

precedent in the history of Macedonia.

1.3 Science and folklore: political use

The excerpt from a Western history textbook quoted above is

also interesting for the very style of thinking and approach to

"the subject," to the political history of Macedonia.

First, it provides the impartial, aloof perspective that is

not to be found in the Balkan region yet is a sine qua non for

objectivity. The perspective in the immediate regional context is

burdened with emotional memories. More importantly, however, this

perspective is inseparable from the political desires typical of

the age of nation-state formation.

Second, the quoted excerpt discusses Macedonia in a way that

is quite unconventional for people in Bulgaria, as well as for

Bulgarian historians and commentators. The popular feelings of

Bulgarians would not allow them to use this impartial academic

style and to list the nine nationalities that populated

Macedonia's territory before the retreat of the Turks. Nor to

discuss the general history of Macedonia in a neutral tone and

with emotional non-commitment.

Third, and this is particularly relevant to the current

situation, this perspective is consistent with contemporary

Western policy towards the Balkans and Macedonia. On the one

hand, contemporary political decisions rest on hard facts, with

distinctly prevailing positivistic attitudes to realities;

emotions do not nor are allowed to play a role in

decision-making. On the other hand, however, the political

significance of this positivistic orientation is in the

acknowledgement of existing realities and dismissal of hazy

concepts such as collective memory, community of descent, blood,

kinship, nationality, etc.

The present aggression towards Macedonia has the best

parallel in the folklore of Macedonia's neighbour countries. This

is precisely where positivist observers become confused and can

no longer identify what is behind the folkloric form. In this

form of experience, Macedonia is "cherished," it is a place

extolled in songs, lost at some point in Bulgaria's tragic

history. Yet without Macedonia - and this is the political aspect

of the folkloric situation - Bulgaria's own history is doomed to

remain a work in progress. That is where the Bulgarian national

awakening started, and it is somewhere in that much suffered for

land that something of the Bulgarian sensitivity has remained;

that is where the suffering and aspirations of contemporary

Bulgarians and their ancestors are rooted. And so on and so

forth.

So how could Bulgarians be expected to take an "objective"

approach to Macedonia? And what does "objective" mean anyway?

Could we talk of being "objective" when our own destiny has

evolved away from us, stranded on the other side of an

artificially drawn border? This is the type of questions raised

simply by the conclusion that the Bulgarian attitude to Macedonia

is shaped by a vast range of mass sentiments. Their answer,

however, raises another range of issues and questions.

The problem is that "objectivity" in any human science, but

especially in the rational argumentation of political positions,

has typical dimensions. It also has a paradoxical potential that

is not obvious from the everyday perspective. In the case of the

Macedonian Question, this potential is manifested in an

unquestionable and unambiguous way. The paradox is that precisely

science, the realm of objectivity, has proven to be the most

strongly ideologized, prejudiced and politicized. The mechanism

that demonstrates this handicap is publicly known and frequently

applied. Both in the past and today, scientists from different

fields have been capable of accumulating all sorts of arguments

in favour of theses such as "the Macedonian language is

Bulgarian," "there is no Macedonian nation," "Macedonia does not

have a national history of its own," etc. Those assertions are

proved in a way that is traditional in science - on the basis of

factual observation and advance of the most probable hypotheses.

They are subsequently taken in ready form by politicians and

applied in the pursuit of a particular cause or policy. This

mechanism is apparently scientific, but is in fact deeply flawed.

The paradox of scientific objectivity is that it ignores the

mandatory distance that should be kept when analyzing facts from

the living environment and human communication. In Macedonia's

case, the genuinely objective perspective may only be that which

coincides with the perspective of the national community's

self-determination, self-organization and self-government.

Assigning "the question of Macedonia" to scientists - historians,

anthropologists, ethnologists, linguists - is a political ruse

similar to the Third Reich's racial doctrines or Lysenko's theory

of the dialectical transitions in Nature. Whether it will take a

tragic form or yield ridiculous results is another matter.

Tampering with scientific evidence is absurd, and only

causes Western observers in the region to raise an eyebrow.

The romantic laments for the lost land, as well as the

quasi-scientific theories about the essence of its public life,

have found forms in which to survive and replicate. Their

sustainability has been demonstrated clearly over more than a

century. The existence of sustainable mechanisms proves that

nationalist appetites themselves have not been sated, but are

merely dormant. Western observers who regard them as a resource

of open nationalist aggression on Macedonia - just like Serbian

public sentiments about Kosovo were a ready resource of political

manipulation - have good reason to be alarmed. It is only a

matter of conjecture when, how and what will activate this

resource. Yet as long as that resource is there and has not been

neutralized, the situation in the Balkans will remain volatile -

and will not be considered stabilized - even if all other

conflicts were to be frozen.

That is why contrary to those who think that the Balkan

crisis has started and will end in Kosovo, the line of reasoning

in this paper suggests the following theses:

The Balkan crisis has numerous intertwining storylines. One

of the main storylines starts with the so-called Macedonian

Question more than a century ago. This question has been raised

and topicalized by the regional context, and is relevant to the

whole region. The Balkans will not attain guaranteed political

stability unless the problems with Macedonia are resolved.

1.4. The language dispute in an international context

As noted above, keeping the status quo is the political

raison d'etre of the Western positivistic attitude. This is

important and should be realized by decision-makers in foreign

policy towards Macedonia in both Bulgaria and, say, Greece. It is

not only the language dispute between Bulgaria and Macedonia that

is incomprehensible to Western observers. The general disposition

that could make such an issue a problem is just as

incomprehensible and alarming. It is as impossible to understand

as a Muslim fundamentalist position or a consistent terrorist

strategy: Western observers will take both into account and

develop instruments of preventive policy but nonetheless continue

regarding them as barbaric and primitive. Positions based on such

dispositions are not reliable partners. There is little if any

confidence in them. Their usual context is qualified as risky

with a varying degree of intensity.

That is why regardless of the particular issues that will be

discussed in this paper, there is one point that should be

understood clearly: if it wants to be intelligible for the

international community, to acquire international legitimacy and

to be acknowledged not only as a rational but also as a feasible

policy of partnership, Bulgarian foreign policy should be

articulated in the positivistic style of the excerpt from the

history textbook quoted at the beginning of this paper; its

factual evidence should be distinctly positivistic; its stance on

regional problems should be based on the idea of maximum

adherence to the status quo, and its intentions and long-term

goals should reflect this principled conservatism. Any attempt to

call political realities into question provided that

stabilization of the status quo is both possible and desirable,

will be frowned upon as inappropriate and suspicious. And any

attempt to advance theses that really boil down to partial or

full non-recognition of the Macedonian nation, culture,

tradition, language, etc., will be regarded as, mildly speaking,

odd and extremist.

Hence the prime concern of Bulgarian foreign policy should

not be the if's, or the pros and cons of recognition. Bulgarian

foreign policy should focus on other issues.

First, not if but how to break out of the vicious circles of

those dilemmas and to avoid being pressured by generally

insoluble issues such as those of national identity and

entitlement to the language;

Second, not if but how Bulgarian foreign policy could take

the lead and become obviously resolute in this respect, ruling

out suspicions that it might be making concessions under foreign

pressure or coercion;

Third, how to make the language of Bulgarian foreign policy

articulate and wholly credible, purging it of all emotional,

folkloric or quasi-scientific jargon.

This brings us to the following thesis:

Any attempt to settle the dispute over the Macedonian

language and nation inconclusively, by means of ambiguous

formulas, as well as any attempt to use this dispute for

political pressure, will breed reservations and suspicions about

Bulgaria's positions. Those disputes should be ended resolutely,

with the terms set minimized in line with international law and

practice.

1.5. Disagreement with the Western perspective

The presumption in this paper is that the type of position

typical of the Western observer, analyst, scientist and

politician is the only legitimate position in international

affairs. This is presumed to be the rational perspective. That is

why precisely this perspective is representative of the stance of

the so-called international community. By "international

community" we mean the community of Western liberal democratic

societies. Needless to say, this presumption is value- rather

than science-related, but it ensues from the objectives of this

text - to provide the framework of a future policy paper on a

particular aspect of Bulgaria's policy of integration into the

Euro-Atlantic club, rather than to promote a scientific product.

Still, while this typological position and its perspective

are above questioning, a distinction needs to be made. For the

purpose, let us take the case of former Yugoslavia.

As long as the Yugoslav federation seemed possible to

preserve, the West ruled out the idea of a break-up. That is why

it proved unprepared to grasp the essence of the process. Hence

the absence of a solid position and preventive action upon the

secession of the first republics.

Confidence in the status quo also prevailed in the

assessment of the situation in Bosnia. As a result, the West was

caught unawares once again. It sat back doing nothing for three

years before it ultimately proceeded to intervene, even though

the intervention option was discussed as early as 1992.

The Dayton peace accord was based on the idea of preserving

a temporary status quo. As a result, today's map of

Bosnia-Herzegovina is quite artificial. This has made observers

skeptical about the extent to which Bosnia's eccentric map is

capable of guaranteeing the desired stability of state

institutions.

In the case of Kosovo, the West again favours a moderate

solution - restoring the autonomy which the province had until

1989-1991 - and has formally refused to discuss the idea of full

independence. Yet ignoring the issue of full independence will

not resolve it; this could only lead to loss of control.

In regard to Yugoslavia and its disintegration, the

traditional Western perspective was mostly positivistic. It

prioritized acknowledgement, respect and preservation of the

status quo, of the facts and realities at the different stages of

the crisis. This, however, shows an overconfidence in the

possibility of freezing the status quo and terminating the

conflict at an arbitrary stage. The motives are undoubtedly

humane, but the intention is not feasible. In fact the Utopian

aspect of the positivistic attitude comes from the belief that a

particular stage of a process may apparently be separated from

the general process and conceived as a stable and permanent

state. The development of the conflict, however, does not comply

with those intentions, and hopes for containing the crisis are

dashed as it proceeds to deteriorate even further in the next

stage.

The crisis in the Balkans may thus be described as a crisis

of dashed hopes that the process might freeze at some

intermediate stage. Our stance is that Macedonia is no exception:

in this case the West is again concerned with keeping the status

quo, stabilizing the institutions and preserving the borders.

On the one hand, this analysis likewise assumes that

preservation of Macedonia's territorial integrity and

stabilization of its institutional system are aspects of a

prudent policy. And that keeping the present order and status quo

will be both fair and beneficial for regional security.

On the other, however, we disagree with the style, ways and

means which the West has been employing in an effort to settle

regional issues in the context of stabilization and preservation

of the status quo. To attain those objectives - and this is the

implication of this analysis - the international community must

think in far broader terms than those of the visible status quo,

and must apply by far more larger-scale, non-traditional and

flexible schemes.

This conclusion is also associated with the idea promoted in

this paper that "the Macedonian case" should be described in

literal, factual and objectivistic terms, as well as in terms of

an intersection, interaction or conflict of perspectives.

2. CONTEXT

2.1. The elections from 1990 to 1996

The November 1990 parliamentary elections were held before

Macedonia's declaration of independence and recognition by the

international community. The electoral system was based on

majority rule. The small parties failed to win any seats in

Parliament. The more moderate, as well as the ethnic parties,

lobbied for a mixed system, while the larger parties -

understandably - supported the effective election law. The

election results were not contested, although the Albanian ethnic

parties lodged complaints about deliberate irregularities.

Following the elections, VMRO-DPMNE, SDSM and PDP formed a

coalition. VMRO-DPMNE and the Albanian MPs frequently boycotted

Parliament. In quite a few cases, there was no quorum. The

legislative process was impeded. Parliament failed to tackle the

main issues which it had been arguably elected to resolve:

constitutional reform, electoral system, privatization, public

administration. The government proved quite ineffective and was

forced to resign after a no-confidence vote in 1992. VMRO-DPMNE

left the ruling coalition and went into opposition. The new

government was unstable and was formed for the sole purpose of

coping with the crisis. In the next six years, the country was

ruled by SDSM, President Kiro Gligorov and prime minister Branko

Crvenkovski.

This is the political background to the next parliamentary

elections in October 1994, which coincided with the presidential

elections. They were conducted under the old Yugoslav laws, and

with the same constituencies. More than 1,700 candidates ran for

120 seats in Parliament. They were from 37 parties, plus 284

independents. The 1994 elections were a repeat of those in 1990

in several ways. This fact was indicative of the type of

transformation which the country underwent in the early 90s. The

elections made the international headlines for large-scale fraud

and gross irregularities; today they are proverbial as a

political event that is wholly inadmissible on the European

continent. Nevertheless, the CSCE representatives testified in

favour of their validity. VMRO-DPMNE, the most significant force,

boycotted the second round of voting - a mistake that is all too

familiar from the Bulgarian experience, and that has enormous

consequences in all spheres of public life. Petar Goshev's LDP

likewise boycotted the second round and had no seats in the

second Macedonian Parliament. As a result of the VMRO-DPMNE

boycott, a coalition between SDSM and SPM - "Social Democratic

Alliance for Macedonia" - won 95 out of 120 seats. Kiro Gligorov

won a second term in office with a 52.4% vote in the presidential

elections.

The first local elections were held in November 1996. SDSM

won 500 of 1,902 seats in municipal councils and 52 of 124

mayor's offices, but lost the elections in the big cities -

Skopje, Prilep, Ohrid. Despite numerous complaints, the parties

in Macedonia acknowledged the validity of the local elections. In

the areas populated by the Albanian minority - Western Macedonia

- the ethnic Albanian parties won a majority in the elections for

mayors and municipal councils. In fact the ethnic element is

probably the only permanent feature of Macedonia's indefinite

electoral profile - which makes developments difficult to

predict.

2.2. Political parties

A large number of small parties were formed in Macedonia

prior to the October 1998 elections. They were established either

on an ethnic basis or around a popular figure. This diversity was

partly due to the VMRO-DPMNE boycott of the second round of

voting in 1994. Parties often splintered - the Albanian ethnic

parties are a case in point. Despite this general characteristic,

the parliamentary parties pursued a policy line that was

comparatively stable and consistent for a country in transition,

at that with unclear national political priorities.

From a macro-political perspective, the party scene in

independent Macedonia is quite familiar to Bulgarians. The two

most powerful formations are the renamed ex-communists from the

League of Communists of Macedonia - SDSM - and VMRO-DPMNE. The

ethnic Albanian parties are the third powerful component. Next

come numerous small parties across a broad political spectrum,

which owe their viability to the overall immaturity of the

political sphere; in all likelihood, they will be eventually

assimilated, with the first three elements remaining dominant.

SDSM is an ultra-opportunistic formation and a seasoned

player in politics. It has repeatedly proved that it will stop at

nothing in the effort to achieve its political objectives - the

anti-Bulgarian part of its elections campaign was a case in

point. The SDSM government conducted large-scale clandestine

privatization similar to that conducted under the Lyuben Berov

cabinet in Bulgaria. In this period, power in Macedonia was

practically shared out among "groupings," or what The Economist

calls "shady conglomerates", that tended to be more like regional

clans. That is why the regional feudal lords were more stable

than their Bulgarian counterparts. Nevertheless, the Crvenkovski

government had the potential to cope with them if it had really

wanted to break up the clan-like economic-political structure.

Another typical feature of the SDSM rule was the political

integration of the Albanian minority through the participation of

Albanian parties in the government. This feature was highly

appreciated - even exaggerated - by Western observers.

VMRO-DPMNE in both the beginning of the 90s and today is

reminiscent of Bulgaria's early Union of Democratic Forces (UDF).

Frequent boycotts of Parliament until 1994, withdrawal from

coalitions, naive public gestures (whose only result was loss of

power) and boycott of the 1994 elections are just some of the

moves typical of the reformist movement. Its social base has

remained unclear too. Its positive features are unidentified. In

general, VMRO-DPMNE has a serious problem with its political

identity, which it will have to resolve while it is in power.

This problem is intensified by the fact that precisely because of

its blurred political profile, public expectations for this

formation are excessive and are not articulated in terms of an

asserted set of values (as would have been the case if, for

instance, VMRO-DPMNE had had a Christian Democratic or other

traditional orientation). So far VMRO-DPMNE has been seen

foremost as Macedonia's saviour from the corrupt SDSM government.

The Albanian minority is consolidated and has strong

political representation (a very important difference from

Bulgaria, whose Turkish minority is scattered across the

country's territory and does not have a political life of its

own). The bond between the minority (about 23% of Macedonia's

population, according to a census conducted in 1994 with

assistance from the European Union) [CF. OSCE BRIEFING PAPER, 18

OCTOBER 1998, P. 7] and its political representatives is

unquestionable - the Albanian parties have a hard-core ethnic

electorate that is unlikely to split as a result of political

infighting. Tolerance for the minority is far greater than

conceivable in Bulgaria - especially as regards the collective

minority rights which the Albanians have succeeded in winning.

Yet the protection of minority rights is not up to Western

standards in either constitutional or strictly political terms.

This is evident especially in the dispute over the Tetovo

University, the attempts to abridge universal suffrage on the

basis of technicalities, etc. This is the obvious prerequisite

for tensions and conflicts. Macedonia, however, has a good and

well-deserved reputation for keeping ethnic peace, as a result of

which the former government is in the good books of international

observers.

2.3 Constitutional reform

Macedonia's new Constitution was adopted in November 1991.

It identifies the republic as "a sovereign, independent,

democratic and social state" (Article 1).

(a) The Macedonian Constitution provides a model of

statehood similar to that in Bulgaria, whose Constitution was

adopted a few months earlier. Macedonia is a parliamentary

republic. Power is shared among the president, parliament,

government, judiciary and constitutional court. The Parliament

(Assembly) of the Republic of Macedonia, called "Sobranie," has

120 to 140 seats. The Parliament establishes a Council for

Inter-Ethnic Relations, chaired by the President (Speaker) of

Parliament (Article 78). Parliament "is obliged to take into

consideration the appraisals and proposals of the Council and to

make decisions regarding them" (Article 78). Contrary to

Bulgaria, there is no form of a Grand National Assembly. Notably,

unlike other recently adopted constitutions in Eastern Europe,

the procedure for amending the Macedonian Constitution is quite

simple. It has not been misused to date, but this fact is far

from desirable at times of instability and sociopolitical

transformation. The Constitution has already been amended twice

without any particular procedural difficulties.

By nominal constitutional definition, the Macedonian

President has somewhat greater powers than his or her Bulgarian

counterpart. Above all, s/he chairs the Security Council of the

Republic of Macedonia (Article 86). Contrary to Bulgaria, in

Macedonia this function is vested with real power rather than

being confined to a consultative-intermediary role. The Council

is made up of members of the executive - the defence, foreign and

interior ministers. The Macedonian President's powers are not

only broader but more concentrated and integral than his or her

Bulgarian counterpart's. Second, the Macedonian President has

greater foreign policy powers, even though this issue remains

rather vague in constitutional practice since the Constitutional

Court has seldom been petitioned and there have seldom been

conflicts over the issue.

At the constitutional-political level, the Macedonian

President has the same informal authority as the top public

figure, as the Bulgarian President. The Macedonian President's

reputation has been improved by the fact that so far the

country's President, Parliament and Government have represented

identical interests and political tendencies. Still, Kiro

Gligorov is closer to a French President in terms of both

political behaviour and aspirations, as well as by constitutional

definition. Yet due to his country's limited resources and scale,

his ambitions - especially in the spheres of defence policy and

security - do not stand a particular chance. The future President

- the next presidential elections are in 1999 - will probably be

more like the Bulgarian President and will take the selfsame

moderate position. However, the parallel with the French

President might go further. A potential conflict between

President and Government or between President and parliamentary

majority is vested in the Macedonian constitutional model. This

scenario is likely, albeit for a short period of time, in the few

months until the 1999 presidential elections. This potential

conflict has not been consummated to date. Unlike Bulgaria,

Macedonia has not been through the political ordeals resulting

from a conflict between President, Parliament and Government.

This is yet another condition for the higher confidence in the

Macedonian President and his greater informal influence.

(b) Political interpretation

The Republic of Macedonia's Constitution is a highly

revealing political document. Similar to, but to a far greater

extent than Bulgaria's latest Constitution, it reflects typical

aspects of the context in which it was adopted. Sizeable portions

of the Macedonian Constitution read like political statements

rather than legal provisions. Of course, these are political

orientations, tendencies and, in particular, fears codified in

the organic law of the land. Macedonia has tried to respond to

the dominant security fears at the level of constitutional

provisions. Those fundamental fears are about the preservation

and integrity of the state in a foreign policy perspective and in

the perspective of the ethnic issue. As a result, the Macedonian

Constitution is a product of obvious ethno-constitutional

thinking in the two-century-long tradition dating back to Johann

Gottleib Fichte. The Preamble of the Constitution stipulates that

"Macedonia is constituted as a nation-state of the Macedonian

people," which practically means that the Macedonians are the

only "constituent people" of the country. The other nationalities

are guaranteed "full equality as citizens and permanent

coexistence with the Macedonian people." This sort of

constitutional provision openly stipulates that the system of

public institutions is based on something more primordial, on the

living national body, the national organism of the Macedonian

people. Thus the otherwise modern Constitution has entire

passages which either articulate controversial and irrational

assertions, or tend to be wishful thinking and do not have an

actual "constituent" function.

In the first place, this is the Preamble to the

Constitution, in which Macedonia identifies through events that

directly refute the neighbours' claims to the country: the

struggle of the Macedonian people over the centuries,

centuries-long state tradition, distinct historical and

constitutional continuity, centuries-long republican tradition,

etc.

The general provisions abound in phrases whose meaning is

implied by the very fact that there is a Constitution, and

therefore do not need to be articulated in an express provision:

the Republic of Macedonia is "sovereign" and "independent," its

sovereignty is "indivisible" and "nontransferable" (Article 1).

Those formulations sound rather like an incantation, strictly

speaking - as if the "inviolability" of "the existing borders"

depended on whether there was a constitutional provision to this

effect. The first amendment to the Constitution applies precisely

to this provision.

Apart from those innocuous and amusing phrases, however, the

general provisions could pose more serious problems if the

Constitution were to be interpreted literally. The assertion that

the Republic of Macedonia's sovereignty is "nontransferable" is

in direct contravention of integration policy - precisely

"transfer" is one of the terms for the constitutional process

within the European Union. The nation-states in the EU are not

giving up, but "transferring" portions of their sovereignty to

the community, to the union.

Further on, Article 8 proclaims the free expression of

"national identity" a "fundamental value," while Article 36

awards casualties of the fight for "the separate identity of the

Macedonian people" special status and privileges. An express

article, 56, stipulates that the Republic shall guarantee the

protection, promotion and enhancement of the historical and

artistic heritage of "the Macedonian people."

There are more examples of the sort.

On the constitutional level, they are indicative of a

tendency that runs counter to the protection of minority rights -

an issue discussed extensively in the organic law of the land, as

well as of a tendency towards "ethno-national-centrism" which is

typical of the Balkan region but sounds anachronistic in the

context of integration.

On the political level, those claims seldom have normative

value but reflect the fears of a fledgling state, its insecurity

and concern about its own existence - for all above-mentioned

examples have a direct bearing on the very existence of the

nation-state.

From a foreign policy perspective, the most interesting and

controversial article is the notorious Article 49, which

originally stated that "[t]he Republic cares for the status and

rights of those persons belonging to the Macedonian people in

neighbouring countries [...]." After Greece protested vehemently,

Parliament passed a second amendment to the Constitution in 1992,

which states that "in the exercise of this care the Republic of

Macedonia shall not interfere in the sovereign rights and

internal affairs of other states."

Nevertheless, Article 49 has remained the most controversial

provision in the Macedonian Constitution. If the claims to

language, culture, minorities, etc. have serious grounds, they

may be identified in this constitutional provision. And, of

course, in the overall ethno-constitutional spirit of the law of

the land. Article 49 and others of its kind may be amended,

supplemented or revoked. The problem is not in the text itself,

but in the Macedonian claims which it articulates. That is why a

policy of intense confrontation with Macedonia on the part of

Greece and Bulgaria might be due to the desire for adding

feasible and reliable protective mechanisms that would anticipate

and undermine any possible future claims to minorities and,

hence, to territory.

On the foreign policy level, however, both the implicit and

explicit implications of Article 49 will remain a problem for

Macedonia.

Macedonia has succeeded in effecting a genuine rather than

would-be constitutional reform. Regardless of its ethno-political

leanings and certain details, the Macedonian Constitution is a

good deterrent, preventive mechanism against extreme

developments. On the other hand, without special consideration

for its adequacy to the specific postcommunist and post-federal

situation, the Constitution has proven quite suitable as an

organic normative corpus for the fledgling state. Perhaps the

most important aspects of the Constitution are that Macedonia:

* has not developed authoritarian presidential dictatorship

- or a semi-dictatorial regime such as those in Serbia, Croatia

or other countries in the region - and has generally avoided,

albeit to a lesser extent than Bulgaria, the extremes of

presidential rule;

* has kept an equilibrium and comparatively normal relations

with the national minorities and, in particular, with the

Albanian minority which populates the entire Western part of the

country, even though the Albanians have made demands which in

many other countries would be inconceivable;

* has a brief constitutional history which shows that the

system of public institutions is vested with stability and

continuity, and that the risks which it faces neither ensue from

nor are associated with the constitutional model itself;

* is not immune to value-ideological bias which does not

have constituent power and is anachronistic, making sense only in

a political perspective and in the perspective of fears about the

very existence of Macedonia as a nation-state.

3. THE 1998 ELECTIONS: POLITICAL ASPECTS

3.1 Electoral coalitions

The most surprising development in the run-up to the

elections was the formation of a pre-electoral coalition between

Ljubcho Georgievski's VMRO-DPMNE and Vasil Tupurkovski's

Democratic Alternative (DA). VMRO-DPMNE is a grass-roots party

typical of a transition period, whereas DA has a limited

electorate but considerable experience in affairs of state.

DA is a new party, formed in March 1998. Tupurkovski's idea

was to create a multi-ethnic party. His intentions, however,

failed due to suspicions on the part of the Albanians and other

reasons - for instance, Tupurkovski's negative attitude to the

Tetovo University. DA is centred rallied around the figure of its

charismatic leader, who is considered the most popular politician

in Macedonia. DA has advanced the idea of a Plan on the

Reconstruction and Development of Macedonia. The party's keynote

document sounds pragmatic and free of ideological bias. It

proposes an extensive project on reform in the country.

VMRO-DPMNE marginalized itself from 1992 to 1998. Its

comeback on the official political scene got a tangible impetus

from the victory in the 1996 local elections. The party has a

diverse electorate, but it is supported mainly by more

radicalized circles - young people, anti-communists, etc. - as

was the case of the UDF in Bulgaria.

Even before the elections, both the parties in the coalition

and observers noted that VMRO-DPMNE was expected to rally

large-scale electoral support, whereas DA would provide the

grass-roots party with guarantees for expertise in affairs of

state and administration, the necessary minimum of political

continuity, etc. The coalition does not have a basic unifying

ideological component. On the contrary, it is tactical in

character, even though for the time being there are conditions

for its stabilization. Its tactical character is also evidenced

by the fact that before coalescing with DA, VMRO-DPMNE discussed

a coalition with LDP leaders Petar Goshev and Stojan Andov.

According to unconfirmed reports, the LDP had frustrated the

talks by demanding the prime minister's portfolio - an apparently

strange move considering that VMRO-DPMNE was expected to rally

the crucial popular support.

Branko Crvenkovsi's SDSM did not form an electoral

coalition. The strategy of the ruling party and its leader and

then prime minister was typical of an ex-communist party in power

after 1990. SDSM conducted a well-organized and generously

financed election campaign supported by the local administration.

The party did not expect to win a majority, but a large number of

votes on the basis of which it would head a post-electoral

coalition. SDSM strategists intended to leave open various

coalition options, which would have been limited if the party had

formed a coalition before the elections. Besides, there were

other reasons for this political campaign decision: a

pre-electoral coalition with an Albanian party would not have

changed the outcome of the elections for SDSM, but could have put

off nationalist-minded Macedonian voters; on the other hand, the

achievements promoted in the course of the campaign were ascribed

to SDSM anyway; besides, SDSM did not need and essentially did

not have coalition-forming principles - on the contrary, the

party would coalesce with anybody and would take a most

opportunistic course of action. There were other options in the

same vein. SDSM practically left open opportunities for

coalescing with the LDP and the Albanian parties, whose votes

would have been enough for a future parliamentary majority.

There are three Albanian ethnic minority parties: PDP and

PDPA/NDP. They formed a pre-electoral coalition which prioritized

the interests of the consolidated minority. The coalition's

strategy was based on the idea that active participation is a

winning card, whereas attempts at ethnic confrontation would doom

the ethnic cause. So far the Albanian minority's political

representatives have rallied around this idea, namely that the

minority should win - gradually, but by taking resolute and

persistent steps - collective civil rights such as equal

treatment of ethnic Albanians, education in the Albanian language

at all levels, including higher education at the currently

illegitimate Tetovo University, wider use of the Albanian

language in national and local public administration,

proportional representation of Albanians in the institutions,

economy, business financial centres, etc., release of Albanian

political prisoners, strong decentralization of government. Those

key demands in the Albanian minority's ethno-political strategy

have been permanent and sustainable, and are unlikely to change

on an ad hoc basis. Actually it will not be an overstatement to

say that the Albanian political parties represent a collective

interest articulated in the most unambiguous, unquestionable and

clear way. The two mass Macedonian parties, which are raising

slogans about universal prosperity and progress for the country,

do not deal with concrete issues in their platforms, or deal with

them in uniform and trite way. By contrast, the Albanian ethnic

parties have concrete programme intents with guaranteed

legitimacy among their electorate and long-lasting value. This

cause has made the Albanian parties a force to be reckoned with

and, almost inevitably, to be invited to participate in

government.

The LDP-DPM formation is not a genuine coalition since the

LDP is wholly dominant. The DPM is not a political party but a

club rallied around a single person. Petar Goshev's LDP refused

to coalesce with VMRO-DPMNE because of wrong forecasts about the

outcome of the elections. The LDP intended to form a coalition

with SDSM after the elections, and to join the parliamentary

majority.

3.2 Election results and post-electoral coalitions

This is what the Republic of Macedonia's new Parliament

looks like:

VMRO-DPMNE = 49

DA = 13

SDSM = 27

PDP = 14

DPA = 11

LDP = 4

SPM = 1

SRM = 1

VMRO-DPMNE and DA have 62 seats in all, i.e. an absolute

majority. The new Government was elected with the votes of

VMRO-DPMNE, DA and the LDP. So far LDP's support for the winning

coalition has been more of a goodwill gesture, but with its four

seats in Parliament the LDP could be expected to tap

opportunities for a closer alliance with the ruling coalition;

all the more so, considering that there are no principled

differences between them, whereas LDP support would certainly

come in handy in the 1999 presidential elections. Arben Xhaferi's

DPA, however, is also in the new parliamentary-governmental

coalition. Thus VMRO-DPMNE has 13 ministers in the new Cabinet,

DA eight, and DPA five. This allocation of portfolios suggests

the following:

(a) For the time being, VMRO-DPMNE wants to pursue a real

rather than would-be coalition policy. This is obvious from the

allocation of the top positions in the Council of Ministers. Each

one of the three parties in the coalition holds a deputy prime

minister's portfolio. Bedredin Ibraimi, the Deputy Prime Minister

from the DPA, is also Minister of Labour and Social Welfare, a

particularly sensitive position considering that unemployment in

Macedonia averages 40% at the national level and up to 50% in

certain regions. The coalition partners are equal at this senior

level.

(b) The allocation of portfolios also suggests that

VMRO-DPMNE is quite moderate and inclined to uphold equality on

the level of the entire executive. Still, the main portfolios on

that level are held by VMRO-DPMNE and DA.

indicates that VMRO-DPMNE counts on and is openly relying on DA's

expertise. The foreign and interior, as well as the justice

portfolios, have gone to DA. The allocation of portfolios on that

level shows that even though it may have been formed recently and

might have come as a surprise to domestic and international

observers, VMRO-DPMNE/DA is at present a genuine coalition rather

than an electoral tactical stratagem. It is hard to say how,

under what circumstances and how long this balance will last, but

so far it has not been imperilled by any jockeying for position.

(d) Vasil Tupurkovski was expected to become Speaker of

Parliament, a highly prestigious position. This institutional

function offers the greatest opportunities for consensual

policies, which the DA leader can pursue without any particular

problems. The position was considered important for Tupurkovski

since it is a springboard for the presidency, which Tupurkovski

openly hopes to win in 1999. Yet despite those expectations and

advantages, the DA leader was appointed Director of the newly

established Directorate for Management and Development of

Macedonia. This agency, which is not part of the Council of

Ministers by Constitution and which is similar to several

Bulgarian independent agencies in the period of transition, will

coordinate economic reform and its social effects. It will

probably have substantial powers and influence. In the transition

period, this type of institutional structures tend to double as

executive power. Tupurkovski's Directorate will hardly be an

exception. On the contrary, it is likelier to have powers which

in Bulgaria are delegated to several agencies. Observers watching

Tupurkovski's Directorate will have quite a reliable source of

information about relations within the VMRO-DPMNE/DA coalition.

4. DOMINANT PERSPECTIVES ON THE MACEDONIAN CASE

4.1 Internal Macedonian perspectives during the election

campaign

The internal perspectives on the Republic of Macedonia's

problems and issues in 1998 are entirely comprehensible to the

outside observer. The perspectives are quite close to reality and

empirical developments in the social sphere. The focus in the

public sphere has not disintegrated into two or more schizoid

parts. The country has not suffered from mass psychosis. On the

contrary, the average Macedonian tends to be realistic, and his

or her perspective gravitates towards that of common sense. At

present, the Macedonian public has not fallen prey to mythical

visions. There are no mass psychoses or fears that normally lead

to the emergence of "hard-line electorates" - groups of voters

voting unconditional, entirely unquestionable and uncritical

support for a particular party. There are heated debates during

election campaigns in Macedonia, but there is a free and fearless

exchange of opinion. The arguments are not blurred by illusions

and hallucinatory political visions. On the contrary, they are

normally centred around tangible issues and crises affecting

people's everyday life - the state of government, the economy,

unemployment, agriculture, the minority issue, corruption, etc.

Analysts should take this type of distinctive features into

account since they have been and will remain relevant to

developments in the country. Of course, Macedonia's stability in

the last decade is not due to those mass psychological

dispositions only. Yet they are quite an important factor for the

preservation of peace, stability and understanding, especially in

the small population centres and the countryside. The preventive

role of this factor could be diminished, especially by consistent

policies undermining confidence and instilling fear. The

cultivation of mass hostile dispositions similar to those in

Bosnia, Herzegovina or Serbia (to the Albanians in Kosovo),

however, is an unlikely political project. Most Western observers

of the 1998 election campaign saw VMRO-DPMNE as a party with an

ill-hidden nationalist programme. But they were wrong. Even if

such sentiments were to develop, instigation of permanent

hostility requires a special long-term programme for which the

political forces do not have the necessary resources at present.

Nevertheless, it is in Macedonia's interest to resolutely thwart

any attempt at the firing of nationalist sentiments and

hostility.

This state of the public sphere prompted the following

developments during the election campaign:

(a) Due to the lack of sizeable financial resources, on the

one hand, and consensus on the main issues in the country, on the

other, the parties could not campaign for alternative programmes.

All set out to prove that they were capable of settling one and

the same issues. It was thus very hard to identify any contrasts.

This made campaigning for a rational programme hard for all

candidates, but even harder for those from VMRO-DPMNE and DA. In

this context, SDSM upheld the status quo, whereas the opposition

coalition responded by criticizing the selfsame status quo. Thus

the two main parties' election campaigns were distinctly

negative. This confused voters and forced them to look for points

of reference beyond the messages delivered by the contenders

themselves. Ultimately, this sort of situation strips campaigns,

campaign commercials and messages of all meaning, and voters

revert to a state of primary confidence in one party or another,

to acceptance or rejection of the status quo independent of all

campaign platforms. In Macedonia's case, this worked out to the

benefit of change and VMRO-DPMNE/DA. Similar to Bulgaria two

years ago, the situation itself, rather than the actors and the

design of their campaigns, brought the former opposition to power

at that - and this is especially important - the former

extraparliamentary opposition.

(b) The anti-Bulgarian campaign, which was conducted by SDSM

deliberately and consistently, was likewise rooted in this

unification of perspectives on the main issues in Macedonia. SDSM

was forced if not to extoll the status quo, at least to provide

vivid scenarios of its deterioration to the point where national

unity was threatened. This was a demonstration in reverse

perspective, a photographic negative, of the assets claimed by

the SDSM government - namely, preservation of inter-ethnic peace

and, hence, of national security and consolidation of the state.

To enhance its image as saviour or defender of the

national-political body, SDSM fabricated a picture of the

opposite situation during the election campaign - namely, alleged

treason that imperilled the very existence of Macedonia - and

blamed it on the opposition. This situation has had precedents in

Bulgaria too - in its election campaigns, the Bulgarian Socialist

Party (BSP) has constantly promoted some modification or other of

the idea of saving the nation, articulated as national consensus.

The difference is that the enemy of Bulgarian national consensus

was supposed to be an internal political one only, whereas the

traitors in Macedonia allegedly had an external ally. This

message was tactically justified but quite distorted and, in

certain ways, wholly absurd, considering that Macedonia has a

consolidated Albanian minority which could divide the country

from within. Yet SDSM not only refrained from mounting an attack

on the Albanian minority - such campaign tactics would have

backfired - but, being well-disposed towards the Albanian

minority and its political representatives, fabricated and

promoted via the media the image of the Bulgarian enemy that had

a political fifth column in Macedonia itself, and this was

allegedly none other than the VMRO-DPMNE leader himself.

The above conclusions may be summed up as follows:

The negative campaign and deficit of ideas and visions of a

political future in the campaign of the ruling SDSM are

symptomatic of a general political emasculation similar to that

of Bulgaria's BSP in 1996. Under the circumstances, it is not

programmes and campaigns, but the situation itself that gets the

future ruling force "elected." In all likelihood, this is a

permanent tendency and SDSM will not return to power.

4.2 Bulgarian perspectives

The cluster of perspectives surrounding Macedonia in its

regional context will be discussed at greater length in another

section of this commentary. Here we will only note certain

different Bulgarian perspectives on Macedonia's internal

situation, elections and participants in them.

Predictably, two different perspectives on the contenders in

the Macedonian elections have emerged in Bulgaria.

(a) The ruling coalition United Democratic Forces (UtDF) has

given full and unconditional support to the now former opposition

- for two different reasons which, in turn, have produced two

different perspectives.

The first position is traditional and typical of the

nationalist-minded politicians in the UtDF, who are certainly not

few and far apart in the coalition. The activity of Bulgaria's

VMRO intensified palpably, and there was open enthusiasm about

the Macedonian opposition. A number of demonstrations on the

occasion suggest an attitude that is not entirely in harmony with

Macedonia's acknowledged independence. In these political and

social circles, however, Macedonia tends to be a sentiment -

sometimes rather primitive and uncontrolled - rather than an

object of rational policy. Insofar as it becomes a policy, i.e.

insofar as there are signs of political rationality or action

programmes in the activities of pro-Macedonian politicians in

Bulgaria, they are secondary civilized forms of the more primary

nationalist urge. This behaviour added grist to the million of

SDSM's anti-Bulgarian campaign. It should be expressly noted,

however, that the Bulgarian VMRO, which is in the UtDF coalition,

is acting in a balanced way and is trying to find rational

arguments. Either way, even if it has aggressive intentions, VMRO

has been keeping them in check and has not been creating problems

for the ruling coalition - at least this has been the state of

affairs to date.

The other position, which is pro-VMRO-DPMNE/DA, is upheld by

pragmatic politicians, especially by the top echelons of the

executive. This group of politicians already know and value the

pragmatic attitude in foreign political relations. They are also

aware of the price that has to be paid for venting nationalist

sentiments for the purpose of drawing political dividends. In

these circles, the sympathy for the fledgling coalition in

Macedonia stems from the hope that the latter would reject the

policy of nationalist isolation and hostility pursued by Gligorov

and Crvenkovski. This might consequently expand the range of

pragmatic political interaction, from which both Bulgaria and

Macedonia would stand to gain. This perspective is popular among

political scientists, analysts, journalists, nongovernmental

organizations, etc.

(b) Just as in the case of many other issues, there was

confusion and inconsistence among the Bulgarian opposition,

within the BSP in particular, on this issue too. The BSP rallied

around the perspective of vitriolic and pointless nationalism.

The BSP had its sights set not so much on Macedonia as on certain

political actors in Bulgaria, pondering whether they might be

betraying some fictional national cause. It pounced on the

slightest chance to attack the UtDF about any government action

that might - only just - be interpreted as recognition of the

Macedonian nation. This shows that the BSP does not have a

concept of its own about the Macedonian case, just as it has no

concept on a number of other important issues. Needless to say,

Socialist supporters are on the side of the losers in Macedonia,

whereas the outcome of the elections has simply disqualified the

BSP as a potential solo political player in decision-making on

Bulgarian-Macedonian relations. At this level of foreign policy,

the BSP has been delegitimated - at that, for an indefinite

period of time.

Bulgaria, there is a popular and rather strong perspective that

does not wholly overlap with the politically articulated and

representative positions. In regard to Macedonia, there is a

powerful folkloric position with numerous variants in Bulgaria.

The term "position" is an overstatement, of course: it is used

for the sake of convenience, even though in this case it refers

to a cloud of notions, a massif of emotions, pictures, stories,

memories, legends, etc. What all variants have in common - the

invariant - is a sentiment and nationalist attitude ranging from

the innocuous romantic to the militant. This mass state does not

have a distinct social and political profile. All sorts of

sociopolitical orientations may be identified in it. It is

typical of people with very different views on other matters.

There is no unifying factor within this mass, and that is why it

has not been promoted to a political platform or organization.

Yet it is a particularly dangerous latent resource precisely

because it is so inarticulate and dispersed. At present there is

no clearly identifiable ground to presume that this resource

would be activated by some sort of political manipulation - which

has been the rule in the Balkans. It is even less probable that

it would activate itself, since it does not have a political

organizing principle and objectives of its own. Either way,

however, this resource exists in its sentimental-primitive form

and should be taken into account. This folkloric disposition

sides with VMRO-DPMNE. One reason is historical nostalgia, and

another - the accusation that SDSM is a pro-Serbian and therefore

traitor party; while VMRO-DPMNE is pro-Bulgarian. This motive

does not have too much to do with the actual political process,

and is bound to be confused as the new Macedonian Government

takes inevitable measures in defence of Macedonia's national

sovereignty. */N-2

In sum, the following is typical of the Bulgarian

perspective on Macedonia:

Bulgaria has at least four different perspectives on

Macedonia and the Macedonian Question, three of them political

and one mass-folkloric. The future clear policy towards Macedonia

will be based on the political perspective that, first, gains the

upper hand and, second, succeeds in overturning and winning over

the popular sentiment.

4.3 Perspective of the so-called international community

The strangest perspective on Macedonia and the 1998

elections is that of Western leaders, experts and organizations.

Contrary to the West's positions on other Balkan issues, its

stance on Macedonia is not elaborate enough and is therefore

comparatively uniform. The following is typical of prevalent

attitudes to Macedonia in the West.

The West sees Macedonia mainly in the context of the

regional conflicts and civil wars from the last decade. That is

why the Western perspectives on Macedonia are not diverse. On the

contrary, Western observers judge Macedonia from the perspective

of a single question: to what extent is Macedonia, similar to

other parts of the region, a potential arena of civil and

military conflict? Is Macedonia a potential Bosnia or Kosovo?

This main question, however, is accompanied by a hidden and

rather specific interpretation which has two basic dimensions.

First, the issue of Macedonia's security and stability

outweighs all other issues. For instance, the severe problems of

unemployment, the country's clan-based division that is parallel

to the already conducted privatization, the state of the media,

the state of civil rights and liberties, etc. - all those issues

are raised and tackled in the context of the main problem, the

stability of public institutions and security issues.

Second, the security issue itself is treated in a

narrow-minded and superficial way. Macedonia and the Macedonian

government are judged in the manner in which the West treats the

Balkan region in general - as a positivist who ignores the

powerful underlying processes, who is concerned with the formal

state of peace (in the Dayton style, i.e. on the presumption that

peace is nothing but freezing the conflict at an arbitrary stage

of its development) and regards long-term visions as academic

speculation.

Proceeding from this presumption, the West has a rather

inarticulate view of Macedonia. Confined to this biased, a priori

and critically non-rationalized perspective, the Western observer

does not subject the situation in Macedonia to serious analysis.

By and large, the West regards the status quo as the best-case

scenario that could be desired of Macedonia. There is something

naive in this perspective on Macedonia, but there is also a

hidden providential prejudice: as if providence had established

some sort of stable order which was not creating extra problems

nor complicating the equation of peace in the Balkans by

introducing new unknown quantities, and this order had better be

preserved from now on. This is the first step in the attitude to

Macedonia.

In a second step, the typical Western view sees the

President and SDSM as the political factor for the preservation

of peace in Macedonia. Since the ex-communist and now Social

Democrats have never been ousted from power, of course it is they

who are the factors for stability and peace. First and foremost

President Kiro Gligorov, with SDSM coming next. This sympathy has

never been hidden. On the contrary, it has been manifested not

only in passive, but also in active, aggressive-evaluative forms.

Bulgaria was the object of the selfsame naive and inadequate

conservative attitude to the political process during the

1996-1997 crisis. */N-3 The confusion about Macedonia is even

greater as it concerns foreign policy, security, regional

relations, etc. The situation is complicated by the fact that

Macedonia is a former Yugoslav republic, whereas Bulgaria is not

stigmatized by such birthmarks.

As a result of those basic presumptions, not only individual

politicians or governments, but even international organizations

which presumably have a more objective and serious perspective on

the political processes, proved to be under a number of general

but also entirely specific delusions. The OSCE Election

Observation Mission made mistakes both in its judgements and

specific organization of the mission. The mission leaders, some

of whom were supposed to study the situation in the field and in

depth, and had a network of long-term observers and campaign

watchers for the purpose, were also under the influence of a

series of illusions and overt misjudgments. In general, the

misjudgments followed the aforementioned steps:

* first, there is order and stability in Macedonia;

* second, Macedonia is neutral in the regional conflicts;

* third, the credit for that goes to the President and the

Government;

* ergo, those stabilizing factors should be vouchsafed

support.

Those factors should not only be vouchsafed support, but -

presumably - they have no serious alternative. The political

formation that is challenging them is actually challenging the

stability of Macedonia and the region, and the peaceful...

stagnation. This was the attitude of the OSCE and OSCE political

and electoral experts - a positivistic attitude which is

described as typical and dominant among the Western political

elite in the chapter on the Western perspective on Macedonia.

The West misjudged VMRO-DPMNE more than anybody and anything

else. There is hardly a magazine, bulletin of an international

organization or a specially prepared briefing paper, as that of

the OSCE Election Observation Mission, that does not describe the

party in the harshest possible terms: VMRO-DPMNE is "right-wing

extremist," "rightist-conservative nationalist,"

"conservative-extremist," etc. The virtually universal definition

is "nationalist," usually modified by some traditional marker

borrowed from Western practice such as "right-wing" and

"conservative." An amazing fact - amazing at least for the

Bulgarian observers in the OSCE mission, was the observer

briefing prior to deployment in the first round. Observers were

told in so many words that the main contenders from the

opposition were right-wing extremists, that it was not accidental

that their organization was called "internal revolutionary," and

that the observers should watch out particularly for action

typical precisely of a revolutionary organization. Despite the

unfortunate experience from the 1994 elections, the popularity of

this stance - negative to the opposition and tolerant of the

former communists - had not waned but, on the contrary, was

advanced even more confidently - so much so, that it became part

of the OSCE Mission's official briefing.

Branko Crvenkovski's anti-Bulgarian campaign was likewise

misinterpreted by Western observers. It was seen as objective,

albeit perhaps somewhat exaggerated, establishment and explicit

articulation of facts by SDSM. Instead of interpreting the wave

of anti-Bulgarian allegations simply as the product of a deficit

of positive messages in the campaign, it was presumed to be worth

of serious consideration. Things seemed quite convincing when you

add objective factors such as the language dispute which is, to

say the least, quite strange for the Western observer, as well as

the fact that Bulgaria had ousted the former communists from

power by that time, and was not too friendly to the Macedonian

government for purely ideological reasons. The big mistake of

Western analysts who took the anti-Bulgarian allegations at face

value, came from something quite simple, really: from their

failure to test those allegations for their potential to mobilize

voters; and, even simpler, for the average Macedonian's

receptivity and susceptibility to fall for such allegations. Had

the issue been considered from that perspective, it would have

been established that - unlike other Balkan countries, including

Bulgaria to some extent - the Macedonian citizen cannot be

brought to a state of mass psychosis nor easily manipulated by

highly speculative foreign political allegations; nor, on the

other hand, do party politics in Macedonia have the appropriate

resources to control mass electoral dispositions by means of

fabricated claims.

Still, those dimensions of a long-lasting misjudgment may be

summarized in a single formula that more or less covers them all

and may serve as a basis for their future development:

The dominant Western perception of Macedonia overestimates

the visible stability, misjudges the reasons for this stability

and ignores the underlying risk factors for national security.

This misjudgment intensifies when Macedonia is seen in the

perspective of past and current conflicts in the Balkan region,

since this blurs the vision of the specificity of the Macedonian

case.

4.4 Regional perceptions

The levels of risk, conflict potential and chaos are so high

in the Balkans that talking about stabilized, rationalized,

prepared for variants, consistently upheld and suchlike attitudes

and foreign policy stands would be nothing short of an

overstatement. This fact, however, is quite curious from another

perspective - namely, that Macedonia is a place in which the

interests of the neighbour and certain other Balkan countries

intersect. Let us mark the main dispositions.

(a) Serbia stood to gain a lot from SDSM's, and successors

to the ex-communists' in general, remaining in power. For a

number of reasons. First, the Kiro Gligorov regime in combination

with the Branko Crvenkovski government was - be it overtly or

covertly - pro-Serbian. This was due both to the current

situation and the priority on preserving the status quo inherited

from disintegrated Yugoslavia, and to genetic kinship and

understanding, as well as to a typical common style of a

postcommunist regime with elements of stronger presidential

authority. Second, the ouster of the ex-communists from power is

simply part of the general retreat of the presidential

postcommunist regimes in former Yugoslavia and, as such, is bound

to affect other countries in the region. Third, in the event of a

change of the regime in Macedonia, Greece is quite likely, be it

on its own initiative or under EU and NATO pressure, to start

reconsidering its hard-line policy towards Macedonia - which

would only isolate Serbia even further. Fourth, a policy line

that distances Macedonia from Serbia and, besides, is inevitably

tolerated by the West, would probably influence Montenegro, where

secessionist sentiments have been intensifying anyway. */N-4

Fifth, if the new government opts for more consistent and closer

cooperation with international organizations and security forces,

border controls between Serbia and Macedonia will inevitably

tighten. There are other reasons too. Still, the most important

ones are associated with Macedonia's exit from the company of

post-federal presidential regimes and the end of hopes - which

Serbia undoubtedly nursed - that Macedonia would develop in a way

that was close to and to the advantage of Serbia.

(b) Greece's stand was not distinctly articulated, and

Greek-Macedonian relations were strained because of the conflict

over the national symbols. Greece has an ambiguous attitude to

Serbia too, with which it has had traditionally good relations,

but is constrained at least by its EU and NATO membership. This

passive hostility notwithstanding, Greece cannot have failed to

realize that it could stand to gain from the change of government

in Macedonia. First, Greece has been finding it hard to negotiate

with the Macedonian President and SDSM. Even though the disputes

seem absurd to Western politicians and analysts, all options for

their settlement under the same circumstances are probably

presumed to have been tried and failed; to say the least, they

have been locked in the same old vicious circle for years. Once

VMRO-DPMNE/DA come to power, the chances that those issues will

be raised in a new way improve. Second, Greece stands to gain

from sprucing up its relations with Macedonia due to the

important links in the Northwest, which are under Macedonian

control. In this respect, Macedonia and Greece could be partners

in EU-funded joint projects. Third, even though it is a member of

the EU and NATO, Greece has weak positions as their regional

representative in the Balkans. Under different circumstances, it

would be far likelier to play an active intermediary role not so

much out of principled considerations but, rather, for the sake

of winning greater confidence and polishing its image as a

reliable power in the Balkans by playing mediator. A change of

regime in Macedonia would improve the odds for this, since the

rule of the Socialists and the incumbent President has been

openly isolationist.

Those arguments notwithstanding, Greece is concerned

foremost with the issue of national symbols and implications

about the existence of a Macedonian minority on its territory.

Greece has not advanced a special, positive strategic vision on

Macedonia to date; nor does it necessarily need to have one at

this particular moment.

of chaos, and is therefore preoccupied with domestic concerns.

First, the elections in Macedonia were of any interest to it

insofar as Albanians officially comprise 23% of Macedonia's

population, to say nothing of the many illegal immigrants in that

country. Second, Albania stands to gain from greater isolation of

Serbia to the South and a tighter embargo, which the new

Macedonian Government could be expected to impose. Third, Albania

is incapable of settling the Kosovo crisis by its own resources

and wants greater involvement by international organizations,

which could likewise be expected in the event of a change of

regime in Macedonia. However, it is hard to identify any

strategic interest - not because there isn't nor could there be

one, but because the extreme volatility and unpredictability of

the situation in Albania makes the very articulation of an

interest almost impossible.

In sum, the following is typical of the regional perceptions

of the issue of Macedonia, the Macedonian elections and change of

government:

The attitude of Macedonia's neighbours to the 1998 elections

and the political process in the country is identical to that

taken by inertia to date - without a special vision, as if

Macedonia intended to remain self-isolated. However, this tacit

judgement or projection is wrong. The winning regional position

would be the position that formulates a clear, pragmatic policy

towards Macedonia and pursues it in a resolute, active and

far-ranging manner.

5. TWO VISIONS ON THE MACEDONIAN CASE

We have hitherto outlined the variety of perspectives on the

issues associated with Macedonia - local, regional, Euro-Atlantic

- and have defined the internationally legitimate perspective.

Having collected a larger empirical corpus - assessments of the

elections and their outcome - we will introduce another

typological distinction between perspectives on the issue of

Macedonia, i.e. between normal and radical interpretation, or

vision, of Macedonia. This distinction does not overlap with any

of those made so far, applies foremost to the perspective of

political attitudes to Macedonia and, finally, is distinctly

oriented towards the future, towards the political projects that

are yet to be initiated.

5.1 "Normal" interpretation and list of issues

The "normal" stance on Macedonia cites Macedonia's problems

in 1998 in a way that makes it possible:

first, to arrange them in a list and to classify them

depending on the difficulty of their solution;

second, to draw up an exhaustive list, since the problems

are presumably sufficiently clear and foreseeable;

third, to have on this list problems that are resolvable as

long as there is so-called "political will."

Thus the normal description of the situation in Macedonia in

1998 will cover topics from a traditional classification:

economy, unemployment, social issues, democratic institutions,

corruption, foreign investment, etc. Of course, the issue of the

Albanian minority is somewhat more complicated, but it figures in

the normal view just as any other issue listed above.

In the normal description, the picture looks more or less as

follows:

In 1991, Macedonia seceded from the Socialist Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia and became independent. In the next two

years it was governed by a volatile and controversial coalition.

There was no real reform. The authorities were preoccupied with

partisan machinations. The 1994 elections were boycotted by the

opposition. The former communists remained in power. In the next

four years, the country deliberately pursued a self-isolationist

policy. It engaged in disputes over the national name, language

and symbols with neighbour countries. Macedonia failed to achieve

anything. The internal situation deteriorated. Reforms were

postponed. The political elite was deeply corrupt. Privatization

turned into plundering on a political basis. The level of

unemployment was the highest in Europe. There were no foreign

investments. Inflationary pressures increased. The country was

among the poorest in Europe. It had problems with the Albanian

minorities which are yet to be resolved. And so on and so forth.

The new government must tackle those issues by their priority...

Any of the above assertions may be expounded in the

respective direction, providing more information. Yet the

addition of diverse empirical material will not change the style

of the analysis and type of perspectives substantially. This type

of description of the situation entails a series of

recommendations which have been made to most countries from the

ex-Soviet bloc since 1989. In brief:

There is nothing specific in this picture. It is not clear

whether it refers to Macedonia or to another country in

transition. The issues specific precisely to Macedonia have been

omitted. This description serves as the basis for universal

recommendations for social, economic and political policies. Yet

those recommendations will inevitably be implausible and Utopian.

This perspective on Macedonia was elaborated in Bulgaria by

journalists, politicians and political scientists. It prevailed

in the Bulgarian media in the run-up to the elections. Statements

and comments were more cautious, since no one expected that the

elections would bring a staggering defeat for the ex-communists

and an absolute majority for the coalition "For Change." The same

interpretation was reproduced and drowned the media after the

elections. At face value, there is even something strange about

that: Macedonia was a top story, and this is obvious from the

press review of that period. At the same time, the promotion of

an entirely unoriginal view on Macedonia logically begs the

question: if that was really the case, why all the talk and

comments? The answer is not in the singularity of "the Macedonian

situation," for that is not obvious in the commentaries. As noted

at the beginning of this paper, the answer is in the singularity

of "the Macedonian emotion," which subsequently takes the form of

an apparently rational, analytic commentary.

The review of the Bulgarian press shows that the normal

stance has not been elaborated in a comprehensive, consistent

form. First, the issue is not content-related but constructive.

In general, all problems facing Macedonia may have been

identified. Yet only a constructively more consistent approach

would bring them together in a single picture rather than in

fragmentary presentations. This will highlight the links and

bonds between them, providing more information. Here are examples

of such links and dependencies that remain hidden when the issues

are tackled on a case-by-case basis:

* The issue of the Albanian minority and its strong claims,

on the one hand and, on the other, the issue of crime and

smuggling in the Northwest, are interrelated and cannot be

resolved separately.

* Unemployment and privatization have direct political

meaning in the sense that privatization has been conducted in

practice, but on the basis of distinct political preferences.

* The attraction of foreign investments - one of the most

concrete issues in Vasil Tuporkovski's programme of economic

renewal (insofar as it even cites a figure of investments in the

next few months, US$1,000 million) - is also relevant to the

clan-communist change of ownership.

* An improvement in relations with Albania depends on the

attitude to demands made by the Albanian coalition partner which

few countries in the world would accept.

And so on and so forth.

Those shortcomings of the normal stance tend to be formal,

at face value - the picture simply remains fragmented, the

relations between the different ranges of issues remain unclear,

and their functional dependence remains non-transparent. However,

more substantial shortcomings may be discerned behind this purely

formal weakness. Bringing together all fragmentary issues in a

single picture proves to be quite hard and introduces new unknown

quantities - as the identification of links and relations in the

previous paragraphs shows.

Here is a sample scenario:

Let us imagine that the first priority of Macedonian foreign

policy was improvement and development of relations with Albania

and the province of Kosovo (needless to say, in the event of

autonomy). In this case, the first domestic political reflection,

the first consequence within the country, ought to be meeting the

demands of the Albanian minority and its political

representatives, in this case the DPA. Macedonia would have to

revoke the constitutional provision whereby the Macedonians are

the only "constituent people" of the country. The minorities

would also become "constituent." Macedonia would have to launch a

large-scale campaign of the affirmative-action type in order to

guarantee the Albanian minority political representation in all

public institutions. Furthermore, Macedonia would have to grant

the Albanian language equal status in all spheres of public life

- apart from schools, this means the administration, justice,

etc. If it pursued such a policy, Macedonia would de facto, and

perhaps even de jure, become a two-nation state. In that case,

however, it would be hard, if not impossible, for Macedonia to

keep control over its border with Albania, on the one hand, and

with Kosovo, on the other. As regards Kosovo, Macedonia would

even be obliged to act as a patron state of a national minority

in Yugoslavia. If Kosovo were to have the status of an autonomous

province, a two-nation Macedonia would inevitably establish

closer relations with the province than Serbia. Ultimately, a

deterioration in relations with Serbia seems inevitable. However,

at stake in a conflict with Serbia would be the very existence of

the Macedonia that would have developed along such lines.

We could imagine other scenarios too. The objective of this

paper, however, is analytical (by contrast, scenarios are

synthetic, constructive figments of the imagination), therefore

we will limit ourselves to the above example only. What it has in

common with other possible developments is that their outcome is

the collapse of the Macedonian state itself and, more generally,

of Macedonian statehood. Yet this development is not obvious when

the issues are addressed on a case-by case-basis and in the

paradigm of the normal vision. That is why the more concrete

weakness of this type of perspective may be formulated as

follows:

Substantial relations and dependencies, on which the very

existence of Macedonia's integral political body depends, remain

hidden in the case-by-case analysis of separate, particular

issues. Those very relations between the particular issues are

the vehicle of the high degree of unpredictability in the overall

situation.

In other words, our disagreement with and lack of confidence

in the normal paradigm are not accidental, but ensue from an

important methodological weakness of the latter.

5.2 Radical interpretation and risk factors

(a) Introductory methodological note

The radical interpretation is openly and directly associated

with concern with a simple yet fundamental issue - the issue of

the very existence of Macedonia and the Macedonian statehood.

This issue - the issue of security in general - is naturally

a fundamental issue for any country. Not only all other issues,

but also the feasibility of tackling more concrete issues depend

on it. No state can afford not to consider it a priority. In the

countries with a stable political system - for example, the

countries from the Euro-Atlantic zone - the issue of security and

the existence of the state itself is doubtless a fundamental

issue too. Typically, however, those political systems approach

the security issue from a long-term preventive perspective. The

security issue is (1) handled by special institutions and (2) has

a special strategic status. In any case, particular aspects of

government are considered in the perspective of the security

issue only when dealing with long-term strategic matters. In

countries with stabilized public institutions and a stable social

system, national security is not an issue in everyday politics.

Everyday policy-making is not parallel to constant preoccupation

with security issues - that would be abnormal and paranoiac,

which is certainly not typical of Western political systems.

The Macedonian case is different precisely at this level. In

the interpretation which we have called radical, the security

issue, in its extreme form, is the issue of present-day

Macedonia. The form is "extreme" because there are factors - risk

factors - with a direct bearing on the very existence of

Macedonian statehood. We believe that this specific difference

ought to be understood well, in their its range and depth.

The risk factors themselves are neither mysterious nor

hidden for the observer. That is why the important thing is not

so much to identify them but to carefully consider their

consequences and, hence, to formulate a preventive policy

limiting the probability of their destructive effect.

(b) An outside view: the occupational ring

The direct comparison between Israel and Macedonia will

probably cause raised eyebrows or sniffs of disapproval. Yet this

reaction would be precipitate. The two countries have one,

perhaps critical, thing in common: both are locked in an

occupational ring, both have ended up in an occupational

situation. Of course, we are aware that this comparison is

oversimplified in many ways. Above all, Israel is in an

occupational situation that is distinctly military-political in

character. The ring around Israel is clear and is all too often

manifested in a militaristic way.

Macedonia's case is more complicated, but this does not make

it either less dangerous or easier for preventive manipulation.

In a sense, on the contrary. On the one hand, the occupational

ring around Macedonia does not boil down to a factor or two; in

regard to Macedonia, there are numerous risk factors and some of

them are mutually controversial, complicating the situation even

further. On the other hand, Macedonia is not backed by any great

power; Macedonia had simply slipped into ill-fated oblivion for

decades, eventually attracting the attention of politicians and

analysts - at that, in the context of other crises in the Balkans

- in the past few years only.

Macedonia is in an occupational environment due to the fact

that cravings, claims, aggressions, nationalist urges,

romantic-memoir passions with dubious political implications,

etc. of all neighbour countries with no exception, meet and

intersect in the peculiar place called "Macedonia."

Greece, the Southern neighbour, denies Macedonia's very

international legal existence. As far as Greece is concerned,

there is simply no such state, since the latter's name and main

national symbols are illegitimate. For Greece, Macedonia is the

holy land where the Greek national symbols have their roots.

Greece has no open claims to Macedonia's territory. Yet Greece's

non-recognition of the Macedonian state because of the form in

which it is manifested entails consequences reminiscent of the

construction known as "cold war." In a more practical aspect, the

Greek hostility and siege to the South are levers of open

extortion against Macedonia. For as a result of this siege Greece

can, on the one hand, raise obstacles to talks between Macedonia

and the EU and NATO and, on the other, extort the country on

various concrete occasions. Either way, the balance between the

two countries is unilateral and drastically upset because of an

extremely irrational nationalist appetite from the South.

Bulgaria has remained at the freezing point where it was

locked by its act of recognition of the Republic of Macedonia in

early 1992. Bulgaria regards the Macedonian state as "valid," but

stubbornly insists that its language is "invalid." The position

on the language, of course, applies to other features of the

nation-state - culture, education, etc. Since language is a

fundamental characteristic, the consequence - be it articulated

or passed over in silence and postponed indefinitely - is that

the entire construction of Macedonian statehood is null and void,

built with the help of borrowed or stolen material. Yet the issue

has a hidden side too. This is the aforementioned latent resource

of popular nationalism and the mass perception of Macedonia as a

severed limb of the authentic Bulgarian cultural and national

body. Macedonia is thus permanently tucked away in the layers of

the Bulgarian folkloric consciousness as an element of the

typical Bulgarian heroic table songs. It would hardly be an

overstatement to say that if the mass - "folkloric" - Bulgarian

were to realize once and for all that Macedonia was not

Bulgarian, s/he would feel invalidated in some

"national-existential" sense. Macedonia's problem with Bulgaria

cannot be "defined" very clearly, because "definitions"

presuppose a degree of external form, of expression, of

manifestation of their subjects by definition, so to speak. By

contrast, in this case the risk factor comes from the mass

psychological resource that could be mobilized by a carefully

planned political manipulation. In a mass psychological sense,

Serbian sentiments about Kosovo are identical:

The political use of the Kosovo myth as "the heart of

Serbia" has consolidated all Serbia, leaving the country without

any opposition. The myth of Macedonia as a severed limb from the

Bulgarian national body is not immune to such use and should

therefore be taken into account as a risk factor at the level of

regional security.

To the North Macedonia had an until recently good - albeit

in objective strategic terms, most unfortunate - neighbour.

Thanks to its pro-Serbian government, Macedonia did not have any

critical problems with the regime in Serbia. Yet following the

latest elections, it could expect a general aggravation, as well

as resumption of disputes over issues inherited from former

Yugoslavia - for instance, the border issue. In fact, generally

speaking, as long as Milosevic is in power, there is no reason

why and no way in which relations with Serbia could improve. The

prospect is either a stalemate until the situation in Serbia

changes radically, or deterioration to an extent that is

impossible to predict at present. Serbia is a source of all kinds

of threats to Macedonia, aggressive military developments

included. Those potential threats worried even the pro-Serbian

elite in Macedonian politics, who invited a UN preventive

deployment force (UNPREDEP) back in 1992. The situation in Kosovo

is apparently impossible to control by applying the Dayton

formula */N-5 - freezing the conflict at an arbitrary stage of

its development, peace-keeping operations and eventual

transformation of international supervision into domestic

self-government. If this strategy is applied, the chances that

Richard Holbrooke or somebody from the same school of thought

might resolve the conflict are simply negligible (we are aware

that this stance is extreme and needs greater argumentation, but

unfortunately we can only mention it here).

The situation with Albania is even more alarming because of

the Albanian minority - officially 23% of Macedonia's population

in 1994, but probably 30% by now. The border between Macedonia

and Kosovo has practically been dismantled. The situation on the

border with Albania is similar. What direction will the "osmotic

pressure" take is a matter of circumstances. Right now the war in

Kosovo and the chaos in Albania have started an exodus of

refugees to Macedonia. In the longer term - in the event of, say,

internal political stabilization in Albania - the direction might

change. Yet either way, to claim that Macedonia has a border in

these zones is a gross overstatement. To the West, Albania,

Macedonia borders on chaos and unpredictability that do not tend

to have distinct boundaries and may spill over by force of their

own internal potential only. Thus if fighting in Kosovo resumes

on a large scale, it is bound to spill over into Macedonia in one

form or another. Or if the collapse of the state and the

emergence of quasi-state forms of government in Albania get a

fresh impetus for some reason, the sphere of chaos will expand to

the East, invading Macedonia. To prevent such developments by

ordinary, conventional measures - for instance, deployment of

troops or implementation of a border defence programme - is

impossible, and proposing them would be ridiculous; the force of

chaos in those zones is simply overwhelming.

This sketch of the quadrangle that locks Macedonia may be

summarized in the following formula:

Macedonia is an extraordinary place in the Balkan region.

This place is the target of expansive appetites and destructive

forces from all directions. Macedonia is the actual centre of the

Balkan space precisely as their intersection. As long as

Macedonia remains locked by this ring, the possibility of the

collapse of Macedonian statehood remains open.

Being in a state of cultural-political occupation, so far

Macedonia has not developed significant mass psychological

deviations, manias or - and this would be entirely understandable

- mass paranoia. On the contrary, the country appears to be

enjoying enviable health at the mass psychological level.

Needless to say, this thesis is not professional. However, it

could be translated into stricter informative and scientifically

legitimate terms if it is substantiated by facts - peace and calm

during the elections, low level of street crime, safe streets in

the cities, etc.

The fact that contrary to countries such as Israel - and

even Bulgaria, which has likewise suffered from mass psychoses

as, for instance, the tense expectations of the notorious "state

of emergency" in 1996 - Macedonia has not developed a reactive

behaviour at the level of the general public and the whole

country, is quite unusual. In Macedonia, there is no mass

occupational complex shaping general public attitudes, triggering

a sequence of events, or driving large groups of people to one

irrational extreme or another. On the contrary, the dominant

attitudes are quite moderate and balanced. Mass consciousness is

free of a sense of hostile encirclement and of a specific form of

occupational ring.

Curiously, however, at the level of political planning and

conscious decision-making this attitude is repeated - needless to

say, in a paradoxical way. Ever since Macedonia's secession from

former Yugoslavia, Macedonian foreign policy has been based on

the postulate of the so-called "equidistance" (from all neighbour

countries), advanced by President Gligorov. This doctrine has not

been changed to date, but the new Macedonian government has

pledged its intention of abandoning it. In fact "equidistance"

has been the Macedonian foreign policy formula for an entire

decade. In a Bulgarian variant, this thesis would have been more

popularly known as "neutrality." Still, there is a difference,

for Macedonia's foreign policy is a policy of consistent

self-distancing and self-isolation, rather than simple

neutrality. It is precisely when examined from this perspective

that it becomes obvious that the repetition of mass dispositions

at the political level is as real as it is paradoxical - for

"equidistance" is simply a deliberate, decreed ignoration of the

country's geo-cultural and geo-strategic coordinates. By pursuing

a policy of isolation, Macedonia has deliberately opted to remain

passive and, furthermore, to disregard the context in which it is

situated. Such a position is dangerous and myopic in principle.

In Macedonia's case, the deliberate policy of amnesia in regard

to the regional environment is highly risky. Even though there

have not been any fatal and irreversible sequences of events to

date, isolation remains a high-risk factor: should an actual

conflict flare up over any of the more controversial issues, it

is not clear whether there are any barriers or resources for its

containment; actually there are no internal resources accumulated

as a result of a definite policy line.

The absence of mass fears about the fate of the country, the

absence of mass awareness about the risks of the environment is a

useful - and even pragmatic and healthy - acceptance of facts;

mass psychology cannot change the latter anyway. This is a

function of the top-level political position, that of state

government. Foreign policy, however, repeats the mass disposition

and even articulates it as a political programme. Hence the

paradox of the parallel dispositions, the mass psychological and

the political disposition:

The doctrine of "equidistance" is a renunciation of foreign

policy-making. Since this renunciation is illusory, the doctrine

is a self-confession of helplessness. This is a form in which the

Macedonian government admits that it neither does nor wants to

understand the parameters of its own context and environment.

(d) Mutual intensification of the "outside" and "inside"

perceptions

The cultural-political aggression that places Macedonia in a

state of external occupation and the internal dogma of

"equidistance" complement and even intensify one other.

The outside views that intersect in this peculiar place are

up against tacit, passive inside resistance. By 1998, Macedonia

had not made any serious attempts to break out of its

cultural-political siege. It actually responded to the external

hostility by sulking, voicing indignation in its own media,

turning its back on the perpetrators, etc. - but did not engage

in active cooperation in an attempt to settle issues with its

neighbours. The siege has thus persisted, turning into a

permanent state to which the actors on the international scene

are becoming used.

This policy of passive resistance is nothing new - on the

contrary, it has had a number of precedents, from Gandhi in India

to Rugova in Kosovo.

Yet the state of peaceful resistance in, Kosovo, for

instance, first, cannot be judged unambiguously and has been the

subject of even polar interpretations and second, if it has a

justifiable reason this is foremost the fact that the Albanian

minority is up against a powerful military machine that makes

active resistance futile. Rugova's hope is that the international

community would not allow genocide - and in a sense, to some

extent, this hope is adequate to the situation.

However, such a strategy is inappropriate for Macedonia.

Macedonia's problem is neither a potential genocide nor a

military offensive. Macedonia is not threatened by Iraq or by the

Serbian army, the way Kosovo has been threatened for a whole

decade. Had this been the case, the problem would have been clear

and visible from any distance. The problem of/with Macedonia,

however, is entirely different.

First, Macedonia lacks substantiality, visibility on the

scene of international interaction. It was first noticed in 1993,

when the UN deployed a small contingent along the Northern

border. Macedonia's visibility has now been enhanced by the

deployment of an international force to evacuate observers in

Kosovo in an emergency. Yet this is far from enough to draw

attention to Macedonia itself and to have its own peculiar

situation problematized at the international level. This sort of

anonymity is all too familiar to Bulgaria, which is in a similar

situation without having Macedonia's problems. The situation has

another dimension too - neither Bulgaria nor Macedonia have

influential lobbies abroad, unlike Serbia, Albania, not mention

Greece.

Second, Macedonia's problem stems from the overlapping,

intertwining and clash of visions, perceptions, perspectives,

attitudes. The non-trivial is in the type of constitution, in

which perspectives play a leading role. [NE MI E YASNO

IZRECHENIETO - KATERINA] Should these perceptions become a

reality - should Greece strip the country of its national symbols

and international legitimacy, should Bulgaria "recover" the

nation and the language, should Serbia take away everything

associated with Tito's contribution to the establishment of the

former Yugoslav republic, and should Albania shelter its national

minority - should those perceptions materialize, the Macedonian

state would be dismantled. And even the memory of the country

would eventually fade - precisely because there are claims to its

memories and history too.

The "equidistance" programme is pernicious because it

consciously deprives Macedonia of the ability to promote its own

initiatives as a result of which the country could achieve a

multiple effect: it could force neighbour countries to comply

with its interests and make the so-called international community

realize that apart from a spot on the map, Macedonia is the

centre of the regional field of forces and interactions, and

therefore merits special attention. And, most importantly, it

could make its own neighbours perceive it, albeit partly, by its

own measure and concept of national interest. Today the idea of a

"Macedonian national interest" seems absurd simply because the

very existence of a Macedonian nationality has not been

recognized. "Equidistance" is tantamount to tacit resignation to

this absurd attitude. This thesis may be summarized as follows:

The interaction between the external cultural-political

occupation and the internal policy of "equidistance" intensifies

Macedonia's isolation. In its turn, isolation intensifies the

effect of Macedonia's "international invisibility." This makes

Macedonia even more vulnerable, since its "invisibility" on the

international scene intensifies the international community's

"indifference" to the fate of Macedonia.

6. CONCLUSIONS

6.1 A look back

Both the general idea and case studies in this analysis have

focused on the following distinctive feature of "the Macedonian

case": the duality of facts and perspectives, of events and

processes, and their perception. We have also tried to

demonstrate the extent to which the pole of perspectives

dominates and, in turn, generates events and processes. Thus

Macedonia is presented mainly as an interplay of perspectives and

the images which they produce. This interplay of perspectives is

inevitable and could be identified in any sphere of human

communication. Yet Macedonia is an extreme case. So much so, in

fact, that "Macedonia as a reality" could be absorbed by the

complex of images of Macedonia. From this perspective, Macedonia

proves to be a name of somebody else's vision, part of another

people's soul, a period in someone else's history, someone else's

experience - which is often in contradiction with another

experience - someone's Utopia, someone else's project, the object

of a neighbour's desire, a lustful-sentimental hallucination in

someone's nationalist dream, part of a neighbour country's

history, a product of the Communist International's political

aesthetics, a piece of Tito's geopolitical puzzle, which, to top

it all, has now brazenly usurped somebody else's national

symbols, or borrowed somebody else's language and nation, etc.

Overburdened by projections and perspectives, Macedonia

seems to be losing its status of a sovereign political actor. It

is proving to be what someone else thinks about it. At that, to a

far greater extent than what a sovereign and viable organism

could - normally - be in the interplay of powers on the

international scene. Macedonia is coming to resemble those

portraits of communist leaders that were produced by the

intersection of powerful beams of light high up in the skies.

This overburdening with projections is increasing the distance

between Macedonia's image and Macedonia itself, as a result of

which the country is being replaced by its portrait. The picture

of Macedonia, rather than its own voice and position, is coming

to outweigh Macedonia itself in the sphere of international

relations.

This has also made the discourse on and with Macedonia

problematic: it tends to impede rather than serve communication.

When the issue of the "Macedonian question" is raised in

Bulgaria, few people can understand what it's all about. And

those who do, have serious grounds to claim that there simply

seems to be no such question. When Greece insists that Macedonia

is a Greek district and a name of an Ancient Greek kingdom and

that there is simply no such state today, Greece's NATO or EU

allies themselves probably find it hard to make sense of this

position. When someone in Bulgaria screams blue murder that

signing an agreement "in Bulgarian and Macedonian" is tantamount

to treason, the chance that they will be taken seriously and

understood in the West is negligible. The Macedonian claim that

there are Macedonian national minorities in neighbour countries

would be far more comprehensible - albeit unacceptable for the

neighbour countries - for international forces and organizations,

as it is simply intelligible, its meaning is clear. Claims to the

nation, language, history, symbols, etc., are articulated in a

language that is doomed to remain unintelligible or

misunderstood.

6.2. A look forward

This paper tends to be critical and analytical in character.

In this sense it is only the first part of a political analysis

of the issue: a specific form of description and analysis and,

hence, a specific approach to, definition and concept of the

issue. A second part should outline more accurate parameters of

the positive alternative. Such a second part would constitute a

"policy paper" to which this analysis is only an introduction.

Resolution of the issues of regional security demands a strategy

that goes beyond the interplay of projected images, perspectives

and psychological jargon. Effective policy at the operational

level would be impossible without due consideration for the

pragmatic sphere. Here we will merely mark certain

recommendations in this vein

All parties [COUNTRIES???] seriously involved in the local

and regional problem situation should elaborate special

mechanisms bringing Macedonia out of its self-isolation -

national and regional - and find effective forms of

internationalizing the "Macedonian issue," the "Macedonian case"

itself. This range of issues should be the subject of an

extensive expert study which would outline both the resource for

attaining such an objective and a feasible timetable.

Neighbour countries in the region, just as Macedonia's own

political elite, should make an effort to limit and, in the long

term, stop using an archaic language that is a mixture of

nationalist poetics and legalese. The language of communication

in the region should follow the style and meet the standards of

the language of norms and institutions used in the West. Of

course, we realize that the word "effort" is naive in this

context. What is really needed is a powerful range of mechanisms

compelling users to change their language.

The debate on Macedonia should allow multiple language use

which, however, is based on the presumption that there is a

difference and there are different levels - political,

institutional, legal, cultural, etc. The different languages

should be separated and used by the respective communities -

politicians, international lawyers, historians, linguists, etc.

The separation of the languages of the different communities is a

slow process; it would not be feasible to expect a rapid change.

Still, the public debate in which experts, political analysts and

politicians have a leading role may be activated and implement

such a recommendation. The first issue on which the parties

concerned should reach consensus is the need for changing the

very language of debate, expert knowledge, political action,

negotiations. The mechanisms that could be activated to this end

are the subject of another study.

* * *

*/N-1. Charles and Barbara Jelavich. The Establishment of

the Balkan National States, 1804-1920. A History of East Central

Europe, vol. VIII. Seattle and London: University of Washington

Press, 1977, p. 207-208.

*/N-2. The folkloric disposition has taken institutional

forms too - for instance, in presumably official historical

doctrines or in history textbooks.

*/N-3. The embassies of the great powers bided their time in

silent and, in particular, skeptical expectation of the outcome

of the crisis. The International Monetary Fund did not object to

introducing a currency board under the Socialist Zhan Videnov

cabinet. Most ambassadors voiced regret that there were such

alarming developments and preferred to remain aloof from the

milestone events. Some declared openly that the West would not

tolerate a forced - which actually proved constitutional -

removal of the BSP from power, the BSP's rejection of the mandate

to form a second government and early parliamentary elections.

*/N-4. The electorate in Montenegro voted for Milosevic's

rival Milo Djukanovic in the 1997 presidential, and for the

latter's party circle in the 1998 parliamentary elections. This

turn of the tide has been a major setback for Milosevic. However,

its effects are not unambiguous. If Djukanovic decides that

Montenegro will secede from the federation, this might well spark

the next war in the Balkans. Serbia will not easily lose its only

outlet on a sea. On the other hand, Montenegro does not have an

army of its own - the army is federal and takes its orders from

Milosevic. That is why the elections in Macedonia have been of

exceptional importance to Djukanovic: he now has a new foreign

political partner, and this partner is certainly not accidental,

considering the deployment of military contingents in Macedonia.

And finally, no one could stop Djukanovic and Georgievski from

developing relations between their two countries in their own,

albeit longer-term interest, without complying with Milosevic.

That is how the elections in Macedonia are a factor intensifying

the disintegration tendency within the federation.

*/N-5. As noted above, Macedonia is seen and judged by the

West from the perspective of the Kosovo crisis due to both fears

that it could be a repeat of Kosovo and the misconception that

the end of the crisis in Kosovo would put an end to the crisis in

the Balkans in general. However, attitudes to the Serbian

province itself are similar - namely, from the perspective of the

Bosnian case. This use of past crises as a point of reference

impedes the resolution of new ones. It is typical of he

positivistic disposition, in which the first step and first

consideration is in the direction of precedents rather than

possibilities. The scenario approach, which has become popular in

the past few years, is an attempt to cope with the shortcomings

of the positivistic position in the sphere of political analysis

and to approach issues from a broader perspective, from that of

the possible.

END.